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Yesterday, the Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow MP, decided to
allow an amendment to the Brexit timetable to be selected and voted upon by the
Commons, in flat contradiction of the Commons’ rules and against the advice of
his senior clerks. The amendment itself sought to require the Government, in the
event that the Commons rejects the deal when the meaningful vote concludes on
15 January, to return to the Commons with a fresh motion within three days. The
Commons subsequently decided to approve the amendment by 308 to 297. The
Speaker’s decision has provoked outrage, principally as it has damaged trust in the
impartiality of his office, undermined the predictability of Commons procedure, and
heightened the political tension in the Commons at a time of crisis. This makes it
very difficult to defend the Speaker’s decision to select the amendment. In this post,
I outline the constitutional context which helps to explain why the Speaker took his
decision, even if it does not justify the way in which the decision was taken.
The start of the debate on Brexit deal: the Business
of the House Motion on 4 December 2018
On 4 December 2018, the Commons began its debate on both elements of the Brexit
deal: the Withdrawal Agreement and the Framework on the Future Relationship.
The first task for the Government and the Commons was to agree a Business
of the House Motion, which sets out the rules and arrangements governing the
debate. This particular Business of the House Motion was the product of a lengthy
scrutiny process. The Procedure Committee had recommended a particular set of
arrangements: most notably that the debate should take place over five days, and
that the Commons should be able to amend the Government’s approval motion on
the deal before deciding on whether to accept the Government’s motion itself. To
their credit, on 4 December the Government put forward a Business of the House
Motion which reflected a consensus among MPs as to how the debate should
proceed. The Government’s positive approach to the Business of House of Motion
was welcome as it indicated that after the long struggle for a meaningful vote on the
deal, the Government had finally grasped that to get this deal through it would have
to seek a cross-party consensus.
Despite the Government’s consensual approach, on 4 December the Commons
decided to amend the Business of the House Motion. The Commons voted to accept
an amendment to the Business of the House Motion, tabled by Dominic Grieve MP,
to change the procedural arrangements for subsequent debates arising from Section
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13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which regulates the meaningful
vote, and crucially, sets out a set of arrangements for how the Government should
respond to a defeat of its Brexit deal. Section 13 provided that the Government
was under a duty to table a motion ‘in neutral terms’ to respond to the Commons’
rejection of the deal. The Commons’ own non-statutory rules provide that motions in
neutral terms are not subject to amendment. The Grieve amendment on 4 December
provided that despite the words of the statute, this motion would be subject to
amendment. The effect of the amendment was fairly remarkable in that it did two
things that are constitutionally innovative: it used a Business of the House Motion for
one debate to change the arrangements for a subsequent debate, and it sought to
counteract the effect of a statute.
A number of procedural experts had assumed that this amendment was out of scope
and were surprised that the Speaker selected it for debate on 4 December 2018. In
selecting this amendment, the Speaker demonstrated that he was willing to bend
the rules of interpretation in order to strengthen the Commons’ position in relation
to the Government. There was not the outrage witnessed yesterday because the
Speaker had more interpretative leeway, in that there was no rule that contradicted
his innovative interpretation of the scope of the Business of the House Motion.
Further, the Speaker was on strong constitutional ground in terms of boosting the
power of the Commons. The Government’s decision to include the words ,in neutral
terms’ in section 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, was widely seen
as an unnecessary, and fairly cynical, restriction on the power of the Commons to
put forward amendments to what in all circumstances would be an important debate. 
There are two elements of the Business of the House Motion agreed by the
Commons on 4 December that should be highlighted at this stage. The first is that,
rather unusually, it specified the dates on which the debate would take place, and
the final day of the debate was to be 11 December. The second is that paragraph 9
contained a power for the Government to amend the Business of the House Motion
by order. Orders made under this power ‘shall be put forthwith’. This is parliamentary
parlance for without debate or amendment. However, such orders are subject to the
Commons approval.
The Government’s decision to delay on 10
December 2018
On Monday 10 December 2018, after three days of the debate on the meaningful
vote in the Commons, the Government made an extraordinary decision. The
Government decided to suspend the debate. The Government could have given
effect to this decision in two ways. The first is that the Government could have
used the power in paragraph 9 to vary the Business of the House Motion by order.
This would have required the Commons approval, and would have required the
Government to specify how they intended to change the arrangements for the
conclusion of the vote. The second is to use the Government’s power to delay the
relevant Commons business to be held on a particular day by simply appointing a
future day for the business by saying ‘tomorrow’ when the business for the day is
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read out by Clerk of the House at the beginning of the day. The Government opted
for the second way. The Government knew that had it put the delay to a vote, the
likelihood is that they would have lost.
The fact that the Government was able to delay the conclusion of the debate on the
meaningful vote on 10 December without the Commons’ approval is at the heart of
the events that occurred yesterday. 
The Government has had nearly a month, since the decision to delay on 10
December, to outline how the resumption of the meaningful vote would work. If
it wanted to win back the trust of MPs there are many steps it could have taken,
assurances it could have given. The Government elected not to do so. The Grieve
amendment and the Speaker’s extraordinary decision to select it was borne out of
frustration with a Government that has repeatedly failed to demonstrate a willingness
to enable the Commons to express its view on the question of how the UK intends to
leave the EU. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that the Speaker departed
from the Commons’ established rules, and at a time where the rules are under
extreme pressure, this is highly regrettable.
Had the Speaker made the right procedural decision and not selected the
amendment to the Business of the House Motion, the House could have expressed
its dissatisfaction with the Government’s timetable by voting against the order to
vary the Business of the House Motion. Arguably this would have been the better
approach in that the House would be able to register its position without undermining
the Commons’ rules. However, the decision to reject the order would have provoked
further procedural and constitutional uncertainty.
The effect of the Grieve amendment
The mischief that the Grieve amendment is designed to address is that under the
terms of section 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, the Government has
21 days to respond to the Commons’ rejection of the deal. After this statement, the
Government then has a further seven sitting days to move a motion in the Commons
on this statement. If the Commons rejects the deal on 15 January, the Government
could in theory use the leeway afforded by section 13 to avoid further meaningful
engagement with the Commons.
The amendment provides that if the Commons rejects the deal, the Government
‘shall table within three sitting days a motion under section 13’. The intended
effect of the motion was to accelerate the statutory timetable, and require the
Government’s statement and the motion to be introduced within 3 days as opposed
to within 28 days. There is a potential issue with the wording of the amendment
in that in technical terms a requirement ‘to table’ a motion does not require the
Government to instigate a debate on the motion. Further, the amendment is rather
ambiguous as to the nature of the motion in question. In any event, if the Commons
rejects the deal, it is expected that the Government would respond much more
quickly than the statute allows for. The point of principle, which was right in my view,
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was that the Commons should be able to decide the timetable for response to the
rejection of the deal.
Conclusion
The UK Parliament may be sovereign in legal terms, but in terms of the practical
day-to-day business of the Commons the executive dominates. This works fine
when the Government has a majority. When the majority of MPs don’t support the
Government, and an even bigger majority don’t support the Government’s principal
policy aim it doesn’t. To survive, minority governments must build a relationship with
the Commons based on trust. The Speaker of the House of Commons also relies on
commanding the trust of MPs and the Commons officials. Unfortunately we are now
in a situation where trust in both the Government and the Speaker is diminishing at
the very moment when it is needed most. 
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